Australia's Prosperous 2000s: Housing and the Mining Boom by Jonathan Kearns & Philip Lowe
Reserve Bank of Australia

















RDP 2011-07AUSTRALIA’S PROSPEROUS 2000S: HOUSING AND THE 
MINING BOOM
Jonathan Kearns and Philip Lowe




Reserve Bank of Australia
 
 
This paper was prepared for the Reserve Bank of Australia Conference on ‘The 
Australian Economy in the 2000s’ at the H.C. Coombs Centre for Financial 
Studies, Kirribilli, on 15–16 August 2011. Thanks to Michael Robson and many 
colleagues at the Reserve Bank for assistance and helpful comments. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia.
Authors: kearnsj and lowep at domain rba.gov.au
Media Office: rbainfo@rba.gov.aui
Abstract
The 2000s was a particularly eventful decade for both the international and 
Australian economies. There were: two recessions in many countries; the 
largest international financial crisis since the Great Depression; the ongoing 
rapid development of Asia; asset booms and busts; and, Australia experienced 
the longest sustained increase in commodity prices and the terms of trade in the 
nation’s history. This paper provides an overview of the Australian economy’s 
performance in the decade. Several key topics are elaborated on, including the 
development of Asia and implications for Australia, policy frameworks, and the 
opportunities and challenges facing the Australian economy, with a particular 
focus on the expansion of household balance sheets and the rapid growth in the 
mining economy.
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1. Introduction
At the start of the 2000s Australia was derided by some for being an ‘old economy’. 
It lacked a substantial information and communications technology sector and 
was seen to be overly dependent on the extraction of resources, an activity that 
was not going to be enriching due to the declining relative value of commodities 
and weak potential productivity gains. However, by the end of the 2000s Australia 
was once again seen as the Lucky Country, riding on the back of rapidly rising 
commodity prices and having experienced only mild downturns at the time of the 
two international recessions that bookended the decade.1 Overall, it was indeed 
another prosperous decade; the unemployment rate fell and incomes rose strongly. 
The 2000s was the first decade since Federation in which the annual growth rate 
of real GDP in Australia remained positive throughout the decade.
The 2000s will be remembered for the mining boom and closer trade links to 
China. In 2000, Australia had a growing economic relationship with Asia, but 
most eyes were still focused elsewhere, particularly on the United States. For 
example, in the volume from the Reserve Bank’s Conference in 2000 reviewing 
the 1990s (Gruen and Shrestha 2000), the words ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ do not 
appear, but the ‘United States’ is mentioned 93 times. The focus has now changed 
dramatically, with significantly increased attention paid to the extent to which 
Australia’s economic fortune is tied to that of Asia. The most visible manifestation 
of the increasing development of Asia was the surge in commodity prices and the 
terms of trade; in SDR terms the average level of the Reserve Bank’s commodity 
price index at the end of the decade was almost two and a half times its average 
in 1999.2 This increase led to a significant policy debate about how to deal with 
the boom in the terms of trade, both regarding what to do with the increased 
government revenue and how to accommodate the resulting structural change 
in the economy.
1 This change in fortunes is highlighted in a comparison of The Economist (2000) 
which summarises the argument at the time that Australia was an ‘old economy’ and 
Grimond (2011) which highlights Australia’s recent success.
2  Commodity prices have increased further since then, so that the average value of the 
commodity price index in the first half of 2011 was four times that in 1999.2
While the commodity boom and the global financial crisis were dominant themes 
over the second half of the decade, in the first half it was strong growth in household 
spending and substantial increases in household borrowing and house prices that 
dominated the discussion. Despite household spending having since moderated, 
there have been lasting effects on the household sector’s balance sheet. A related 
major policy debate of the decade concerned the causes and consequences of 
this housing boom.
A third theme of the decade surrounded developments in the labour market. At 
the start of the decade the unemployment rate was around 6½ per cent. Gruen 
and Stevens (2000) noted that stable growth and a long expansion meant that 
maintaining the unemployment rate below 6 per cent seemed ‘only slightly 
ambitious’ whereas earlier in the 1990s it would have ‘seemed ludicrous to 
many’. In the end, the unemployment rate was below 6 per cent for two-thirds 
of the 2000s, and reached a trough of 4 per cent, a rate not seen since the mid 
1970s. This impressive performance raised an important question: below what 
rate of unemployment would inflation accelerate? In the quest to enhance the 
functioning of the labour market there were substantial debates regarding the form 
of regulations that would achieve the best employment and social outcomes. This 
issue is considered in detail in Borland (2011) and so is not pursued further here.
Over the decade, growth in employment was strong relative to that in output, 
with labour productivity growth slowing markedly from the rates in the 1990s. 
The capital stock also grew more rapidly in the 2000s than in the 1990s, so that 
the slowdown in multifactor productivity was more pronounced. The issue of 
weak productivity growth periodically surfaced, but was to some extent hidden 
by reasonable growth in output as a result of greater factor usage and by a boost 
to real incomes from the rise in the terms of trade. These trends are discussed in 
more detail by Eslake (2011b).
In this paper we provide an overview of the Australian economy in the 2000s. The 
paper begins with a comparison of the performance of the Australian economy 
in the 2000s to that in previous decades. Sections 3 and 4 then consider the 
implications of the two driving forces for the two halves of the decade: the changes 
to household balance sheets and the impact on Australia of rapid development in 
Asia. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the major debates regarding monetary and fiscal 
policy. While the role of policy has generally been less topical in the 2000s than 
was the case in the 1990s, there were nonetheless active debates regarding the role 3
of asset prices in monetary policy settings, and how fiscal policy should respond 
to a rising terms of trade. Finally, in Section 7 the paper considers how Australia 
might best take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the transformation 
of the global economy, while at the same time managing the risks that come with 
this transformation.
2.  Overview of the Decade
Despite the perception of being an old economy, Australia was experiencing 
above-average growth at the turn of the century, with strong domestic demand 
and stimulus provided by a strong international economy and a low exchange rate 
(Figure 1). The announced introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
on 1 July 2000 resulted in a substantial bring-forward in housing investment 
which saw a slowing in the second half of the year. Just as the economy was 
recovering, the international economy was slowing, with the United States and a 
few other developed economies entering a shallow recession (see Bayoumi and 
Bui (2011) for a summary of the North Atlantic economies over the decade). It 
had often been said that when the United States sneezes, Australia catches a cold. 
But on this occasion, the Australian economy did not follow the United States 
into recession. There are a number of reasons for this. The first is that, thanks to 
fortuitous timing, the Australian economy was bouncing back from the slowing 
in the second half of 2000 associated with the introduction of the GST. Second, 
in a signal of the changing economic landscape, Australia’s major trading partner 
growth remained positive thanks to strong growth in Asia and despite output in 
the G7 declining in three consecutive quarters. Third, the bursting of the tech 
bubble did not lead to large negative wealth effects in Australia as the absence of 
large tech firms meant that the domestic equity market continued to rise through 
to 2002 as global markets declined. Finally, reinforcing these effects, household 
spending remained strong as house prices and household wealth continued to 
rise. As the Australian economy outperformed other developed economies in the 
early part of the decade, the Australian dollar rebounded from its all-time low in 
2001 to around the average of the floating era by 2003.4
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Consumer spending in Australia continued to grow at a brisk rate following the 
global downturn, fuelled by rising incomes and wealth. The robust growth in 
domestic demand was to a large extent self-reinforcing, as strong employment 
growth and rising wages drove income growth, which in turn contributed to 
rapid house price growth. The increasing value of housing assets, and solid 
stock market returns, meant that household wealth grew at an above-average 
rate. Consequently, households felt more confident and were willing to take on 
more debt and reduce their saving. The impact on household balance sheets of 
rapid house price growth and the associated increase in debt was substantial, as 
discussed further in Section 4. Concern that speculative elements were building 
given the rapid price growth and expansion of credit, and the possibility of the 
erosion of lending standards, led to a number of policy initiatives, as outlined in 
Section 5 (see also Bloxham, Kent and Robson (2010)). While domestic demand 
was strong, export growth was weaker than might have been expected given 
above-average growth in Australia’s major trading partners, and consequently 
the trade deficit and current account deficit remained wide.
In late 2003 the seemingly inexorable rise in house prices finally abated with 
national dwelling prices flat in nominal terms over the following couple of years; 5
prices fell in Sydney, with small price rises in most other cities. Nevertheless, 
households remained optimistic, with consumption broadly growing in line with 
incomes and the net household saving ratio remaining around zero. Gradually, 
though, business investment came to play a more important role as a driver of 
growth in the middle part of the decade. Initially the strength in investment was 
in the non-mining economy, but with the sharp increase in commodity prices 
from 2005, mining investment increased dramatically (as discussed by Connolly 
and Orsmond (2011)). With this shift from consumption to investment, domestic 
demand continued to be the main source of growth for the Australian economy as 
export growth remained below expectations. Resource volumes were unable to 
respond immediately to the stronger global demand, and the further appreciation 
of the Australian dollar associated with the rise in commodity prices weighed on 
other exports and stimulated import demand.
Through this sustained expansion in the middle of the decade, excess capacity was 
gradually absorbed with the unemployment rate declining by 3 percentage points 
from late 2001 and survey measures of capacity utilisation reaching record highs. 
With inflationary pressures building, monetary policy was gradually tightened 
over a long six-year phase. The cash rate reached 7.25 per cent in early 2008, its 
highest level in over a decade.
The domestic economy was slowing over the first half of 2008, prior to the extreme 
financial shock in September in the aftermath of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
The resulting collapse in sentiment and the marked deterioration in the global 
economic outlook precipitated a sharp fall in commodity prices and the Australian 
dollar and a prompt fiscal and monetary stimulus in Australia. By May 2009, the 
RBA’s commodity price index in SDRs had fallen by over 30 per cent from its 
October 2008 level, while the Australian dollar depreciated by around 30 per cent 
over the six months from its July 2008 peak. The first stage of a large discretionary 
fiscal stimulus – which totalled around 6 per cent of GDP over several packages 
– was implemented within three months of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
Monetary policy was also eased rapidly, with the cash rate cut by 100 basis points 
at the scheduled Reserve Bank board meeting just three weeks after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, and by a total of 375 basis points within five months of the 
Lehman Brothers collapse. The downturn in Australia turned out to be milder 
than expected, thanks to the rapid policy response, the sharp depreciation of the 
Australian dollar and the strong demand for bulk commodities from China, which 
resulted in part from infrastructure construction associated with China’s own 6
large fiscal stimulus. As a result of China’s demand, Australian export volumes 
continued to grow through late 2008 and early 2009, a remarkable performance 
given global trade volumes fell by around 20 per cent.3 Despite the deep recessions 
in developed economies, key emerging economies continued to grow and demand 
for Australian export commodities rebounded quickly with SDR prices exceeding 
their previous peak a little over 18 months after their precipitous decline.
The Australian dollar quickly appreciated along with rising commodity prices. 
Apart from the large, but short-lived, fall during the financial crisis, the currency 
trended higher over the 2000s with the trade-weighted exchange rate appreciating 
more than 40 per cent in nominal terms from its trough in 2001 to the end of 
the decade, and almost 60 per cent on a real basis (Figure 2). By the end of the 
decade, the real effective exchange rate was at its highest level since 1977.
Figure 2: Australian Dollar TWI
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Sources:  RBA; Thomson Reuters; WM/Reuters
A recurring theme in the second half of the decade was that the economy was 
operating at multiple speeds, with rapid growth in mining and related sectors, and 
below-trend growth in a number of other sectors and in the south-eastern states. 
3  See Kearns (2011) for a discussion of the roles of policy and external demand in the 
performance of the Australian economy in 2008–2009 in the context of a comparison with 
Canada.7
This often led to the claim that monetary policy settings were inappropriately 
tight for the non-mining parts of the economy. This mirrored the argument earlier 
in the decade that the setting of monetary policy was overly tight because of 
the housing boom in the south-eastern states. While there were differences in 
regional and sectoral economic performance, on the whole there was substantial 
spillover from the mining sector to other parts of the economy through demand for 
goods and services by the mining sector, taxes and income flows to other sectors 
through dividend payments, as discussed in Connolly and Orsmond (2011) and 
Stevens (2010a, 2011).
2.1  The 2000s in Historical Context
On many levels the 2000s were a successful decade for Australia. As discussed 
above, Australia experienced relatively mild downturns in the face of two 
international recessions, and in between these experienced a strong expansion. 
Annual employment growth averaged 2.2 per cent over the decade, substantially 
faster than in the 1990s and recovering to rates recorded in the 1960s and 
1980s (Table 1). In both downturns experienced in Australia, the increase in the 
unemployment rate was much smaller than in the 1980s and 1990s recessions, 
and subsequently fell more quickly. Consequently, the average unemployment 
rate over the decade was significantly lower than in the 1980s and 1990s and, 
in addition, there was a substantial increase in the participation rate. Indeed, the 
low unemployment rate in the second half of the decade – which troughed at 
4 per cent, a rate not seen since the mid 1970s – prompted significant consideration 
as to what rate represented full employment (see Borland (2011)).8
Table 1: Macroeconomic Outcomes
Decade averages, per cent
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Real GDP growth 5.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.0
Real GDP per capita growth 3.0 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.5
Employment growth(a) 2.5 1.6 2.4 1.2 2.2
Unemployment rate 2.0 3.9 7.6 8.8 5.5
CPI inflation (excl interest)(a) 2.5 10.1 8.1 2.8 3.2
CPI inflation (excl interest 
and GST impact)(a) 2.5 10.1 8.1 2.8 2.8
Balance of trade  
(per cent of GDP) –1.1 0.0 –1.9 –0.8 –1.3
Current account  
(per cent of GDP) –1.8 –1.1 –4.1 –4.0 –4.6
Note:   (a) Annualised rate
Sources:  ABS; RBA
The introduction of the GST at the start of the decade added a little over 3 percentage 
points to the headline inflation rate. As this was a temporary impact, the Reserve 
Bank said at the time it would not react to this spike in inflation. Abstracting 
from this, annual inflation over the decade averaged 2.8 per cent, consistent with 
the inflation target that inflation should average ‘two-point-something’, although 
slightly higher than the 1990s inflation-targeting period.4 
For much of the 2000s, growth in export volumes was surprisingly weak given 
generally strong external conditions, the low value of the exchange rate over the 
first part of the decade and the strong commodity demand over the latter part of 
the decade. Conversely, the growth in consumption and investment resulted in 
strong import growth. Consequently, the average trade deficit, at 1.3 per cent of 
GDP, was larger than in the 1990s, but still smaller than in the 1980s. Toward 
the end of the decade the trade position moved to surplus, as a result of the 
increased value of resource exports. The average current account deficit in the 
2000s was larger than in previous decades at 4.6 per cent of GDP, reflecting 
the trade deficit as well as increased net foreign liabilities and strong returns on 
Australian assets. Equivalently, the large current account deficit in Australia can 
be seen as the outcome of the high investment rate. This was Australia’s largest 
4  The target of inflation averaging between 2 and 3 per cent over the cycle is sometimes 
misinterpreted to imply inflation should average this midpoint of 2.5 per cent. For an early 
expression of the target equating to inflation averaging ‘two-point-something’, see Debelle 
and Stevens (1995).9
decade average current account deficit in the period since Federation. Yet the 
1980s debate about the perils of current account deficits summarised in Tease 
(1990) did not resurface, with a general view that the current account deficit in 
Australia did not represent an imbalance, but rather the outcome of savings and 
investment decisions of individuals and firms in the absence of major distortions, 
as discussed in Debelle (2011).
One area in which Australia’s performance over the 2000s was less impressive 
is the growth of output per capita. While average real GDP growth, at 3 per cent, 
was roughly ½ percentage point less than in the 1980s and 1990s, growth in 
real GDP per capita was ¾ percentage point less than in the 1990s reflecting 
the stronger population growth in the 2000s (Figure 3). Further, much of this 
growth in per capita GDP reflected greater use of factors of production: labour 
utilisation increased with the decline in the unemployment rate and the increase 
in the participation rate, while the pick-up in investment resulted in faster growth 
in the capital stock (Figure 4). The relatively weak growth in output given the 
stronger growth in labour and capital reflects the marked slowing in multifactor 
productivity growth in the 2000s. In contrast, productivity growth, and so growth 
of GDP per capita, had accelerated in the 1990s following significant economic 
reforms.
While growth in productivity and GDP per capita were weak in the 2000s, this 
was offset by the large increase in the terms of trade, which resulted in faster real 
income growth. Real gross domestic income (GDI) per capita grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.3 per cent, the fastest rate since the 1960s, and well above the 
1.5 per cent average growth in per capita real GDP. Since this margin between 
GDP and GDI growth reflected the increase in the terms of trade from higher 
commodity prices, and the mining sector has significant foreign ownership, 
some of this income growth will have accrued to foreigners (see Connolly and 
Orsmond (2011)). 10
Figure 3: Output and Income
Per capita, average annual growth


















Sources:  ABS; RBA
Figure 4: Labour and Capital
Average annual growth



















Note:    Heads-based growth in labour prior to September 1966
Sources:  ABS; RBA11
3.  Development in Asia – Implications for Australia
Australia has greatly benefited from the rapid growth in Asia over the past decade, 
in particular in China and India. As Huang and Wang (2011) summarise, the 
development of Asia has been quite remarkable. Not only did Asian countries 
experience fast growth in the 2000s, but for China and India this growth was 
uninterrupted in contrast to the major developed economies. As a result, Asia’s 
share (excluding Japan) of world GDP, at market exchange rates, has increased 
from around 10 per cent in 2000 to 17 per cent in 2010. Australia has prospered 
from this growth, both because of its endowment of natural resources and because 
growth in Asia means that there are now large economies closer to Australia than 
has previously been the case.
Industrialisation and urbanisation in China, and elsewhere in Asia, has greatly 
increased demand for resources, especially coal and iron ore for producing steel. 
China alone now accounts for almost half of global steel production. Australia 
is a major exporter of the key resources for steel production because it has large 
endowments of coal and iron ore, relative to a comparatively small population. In 
2010, iron ore accounted for 17 per cent of the value of Australia’s exports, while coal 
accounted for another 15 per cent. This represented incredible growth, rising from 
3 and 7 per cent of export values, respectively, in 2003. Other exporters of these 
bulk commodities, such as Brazil for iron ore, have also benefited from this strong 
demand and the associated rising prices. However, being closer to China with 
direct shipping access has been an additional benefit for Australian producers as it 
lowers the cost of shipping. This boosts demand for Australian bulk commodities 
or increases the revenue of Australian producers, and so benefits Australian 
producers in the same way as having lower extraction costs.
The increase in commodity prices, and in particular coal and iron ore prices, has 
led to substantial efforts to increase commodity production. Since 2005, mining 
investment has increased from 12½ per cent of total private business investment to 
be around one-quarter. As a share of GDP, mining investment has increased from 
less than 2 per cent to around 4 per cent now, and with a significant contribution 
from liquefied natural gas (LNG) is forecast to increase to be above 6 per cent in 
coming years. Mining is more capital intensive than other industries and so, with 
a bigger mining sector, Australia’s capital-output and investment-output ratios 
have increased and are likely to remain higher than they have been.12
The increase in the size of the mining sector is likely to make the Australian 
economy, and its fiscal position, more cyclical. Commodity prices are inherently 
more volatile than prices of services or manufactured goods because supply is 
typically less elastic in the short run and demand more sensitive to economic 
cycles. In addition, historically, the difficulty in forecasting commodity demand 
and prices, particularly at the long horizons of resource investment projects, has 
often led to over-investment and ‘hog cycles’.
The mining boom has had other implications for the structure of the Australian 
economy. As well as mining investment and construction, it has increased the 
demand for labour, although overall mining-related employment remains a very 
small share of total employment. The flexibility of the Australian labour market 
has thus far enabled this greater demand to be accommodated without significant 
labour shortages or widespread increases in wages. The increase in commodity 
prices has also seen the Australian dollar appreciate significantly to 30-year highs 
in real terms, contributing to the reallocation of resources within the economy.
The growth of Asian economies has also lessened the isolation of Australia from 
major economic markets. Quah (2011) documents how the centre of global 
economic activity has shifted from being in the mid Atlantic in 1980, to be east 
of Bucharest in 2008, and is projected to be between China and India by 2050. 
Australia is still not close in absolute distance to large economies; for example, 
Beijing and Delhi are both closer to London than they are to Sydney. However, 
it certainly is the case that Australia is closer to Asia than it is to Europe or the 
United States. So the expansion of the Asian economies reduces Australia’s 
relative economic isolation. This should work to increase Australia’s trade, as 
distance is significant in explaining a country’s trade; see, for example, Guttman 
and Richards (2006) and Disdier and Head (2008). Despite this, while the ratio 
of Australia’s imports and exports to GDP increased in the 1990s following 
tariff reductions, it has been relatively stable through the 2000s despite the rapid 
growth of Asian economies.
The benefits of this relative proximity to large economies in Asia are likely to be 
more evident in some non-resource sectors, particularly services such as tourism 
and education. Education has been one of Australia’s strongest growing export 
sectors; being relatively close, in a similar time zone with well-established English-
language courses and generally favourable visa arrangements is an advantage. 
Australia is one of the five largest education exporters in the OECD and much 13
of this demand has come from China and India. China and India together now 
account for just over 40 per cent of Australian education exports versus around 
15 per cent at the start of the decade. But growth in education exports is likely 
to slow because of increased competition internationally, the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar, more restrictive visa requirements and some domestic capacity 
constraints (Hall and Hooper 2008).
Similarly, the share of tourism from China and Hong Kong is roughly double 
what it was in 2000; with a combined share of around 11 per cent they represent 
the second largest source of tourist arrivals. Nevertheless, this is still only half of 
the share coming from other countries in Asia, even after excluding Japan. But 
while rising incomes in Asia have increased tourist numbers, macroeconomic and 
other factors still have a dominant impact on tourism. The rising Australian dollar 
over the decade has depressed inbound international tourist numbers – as did 
the terrorist attacks in September 2001, the outbreak of SARS, and the financial 
crisis – so that overall growth in this sector has been weak.
The effects of developments in Asia flow through Australian imports as well as 
exports. Urbanisation and industrialisation has greatly expanded the production 
of manufactures in non-Japan Asia. As a result, the share of global manufactures 
trade coming from Asia, and China in particular, has greatly increased over the 
past decade. The heightened competition from Asian manufacturers exerted 
significant downward pressure on global manufactures prices. Consequently 
Australian import price growth was low over the decade, which also worked to 
boost the terms of trade. Overall, imports from Asia have increased from around 
40 per cent of total imports at the start of the decade to around one-half.
There are some similarities in the impact on Australia from the development 
of China over the past decade and the growth of Japan in the mid 1960s to 
mid  1970s.  Japan  was  already  a  significant  trading  partner  accounting  for 
17 per cent of Australia’s merchandise exports in 1965. With continued rapid 
growth over the following decade, Japan’s demand for resources from Australia 
increased substantially. The share of Australian exports going to Japan doubled to 
34 per cent and the resource share of Australian exports trebled to just under 
40 per cent (Figure 5). This increase in Australia’s resource exports and the 
importance of an individual trading partner looks remarkably similar to the 
2000s. However, an important difference is that over the period from 1965 to 
1975 Australia’s terms of trade did not increase as they have recently (Figure 6). 14
The increase in Australia’s resource exports to Japan resulted from rapid growth 
in the volume of resource exports, with resource prices moving broadly in line 
with import prices. In part, the rapid growth in volumes reflected the discovery 
and development of large iron ore deposits. In contrast, over the past decade the 
increase in the share of resource exports is attributable to a substantial increase 
in prices, not volumes.
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99/00 89/90 79/80 69/70 59/60
Note:    (a) Excludes mineral fuels and gold pre 1974/75
Sources:  ABS; Foster (1996)15
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The difference in the price response is not simply because China is a larger country; 
at market exchange rates China’s share of global GDP now is broadly similar 
to Japan’s share in the mid 1970s. One key difference in the current episode is 
that China is experiencing much more resource-intensive growth compared with 
Japan in the 1960s. Indeed, Eslake (2011a) shows that the share of global GDP 
produced by countries at a resource-intensive stage of development is currently 
much larger than at any time in the second half of the 1900s. China’s share of 
global steel production has increased from 15 per cent at the start of the decade to 
around 45 per cent in 2010. In contrast, Japan’s share of global steel production 
peaked at 17 per cent in 1973.5 Similarly, at the end of the decade China accounted 
for close to half of global coal consumption, over 10 times Japan’s share in the 
1960s and 1970s.6 Furthermore, Australia’s resource export volumes also grew 
more rapidly in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, with annualised growth 
5  World Steel Association (2010).
6  BP (2010).16
around 15 to 20 per cent, compared to 5 per cent over the past decade, seemingly 
reflecting the greater difficulties with expanding an already large and relatively 
mature mining industry.
4.  Household Balance Sheets
At the start of the decade, households were facing favourable economic conditions. 
Steady growth in employment and wages was delivering rising incomes, while 
wealth was increasing with rapid growth in house prices and steady, if not 
spectacular, increases in domestic share prices. These factors gave households 
the confidence to reduce their saving. Further, household saving out of current 
income was reduced as households moved to a higher debt-to-income level because 
of their greater access to credit. The saving rate continued the decline that had 
commenced in the mid 1980s, and by early in the 2000s household spending (net 
of depreciation) was estimated to exceed household incomes (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Household Saving Ratio
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Notes:   Net of depreciation; 13-period Henderson trend
Sources:  ABS; RBA17
House prices had begun to rise from the mid 1990s reflecting a couple of key factors. 
First, the decline in nominal interest rates associated with lower inflation reduced 
the initial repayment burden for a given loan size and so increased households’ 
borrowing capability. Second, the increased competition and innovation in the 
lending market that started with the reforms of the banking sector in the 1980s 
had greatly increased the accessibility and availability of housing finance (see 
Ellis (2006) and Yates (2011)). In the late 1990s the rate of dwelling price growth 
accelerated and in the first four years of the 2000s prices increased at an average 
rate of 14 per cent.
Rising house prices were accompanied by accelerating growth in borrowing for 
housing. Growth in housing credit increased from rates around 12 per cent in the 
second half of the 1990s to over 20 per cent in 2003 (Davis (2011) summarises 
this and other financial developments over the decade). The sense that this 
was unsustainable was heightened by the increasing share of this borrowing 
undertaken by households buying properties to rent out rather than owner-occupy. 
As discussed in Bloxham et al (2010) and in Section 5, the dynamics of rapid 
house price and credit growth, in conjunction with some signs of excess in parts 
of the housing and lending markets, became an increasing concern for the Reserve 
Bank and other policy-makers. Partly in response to policy measures, national 
house prices plateaued in late 2003 and were broadly flat in nominal terms over 
the following two years. While there were some differing regional cycles, notably 
with falls in nominal prices in Sydney in 2004 and prices in Perth continuing to 
grow strongly, overall national house prices grew broadly in line with household 
incomes between 2003 and 2008, followed by a small fall in the national median 
house price in 2008 (Figure 8). Nevertheless, credit continued to grow at a brisk 
pace, not slowing to the 12 per cent rates of the late 1990s until late 2005. With 
growth in household borrowing outpacing that in incomes, the ratio of household 
liabilities to incomes continued to rise, as did the ratio of liabilities to assets.18
Figure 8: Household Wealth and Liabilities


















Notes:     Household sector includes unincorporated enterprises; disposableincome is before the deduction of 
interest payments
Sources:  ABS; APM; RBA
Financial asset holdings also increased over the decade. This masked differing 
trends, with superannuation assets as a ratio to income increasing strongly from 
around 110 per cent at the start of the decade to over 150 per cent (Figure 9). 
This reflected strong compulsory and voluntary flows into superannuation and the 
large share of superannuation invested in domestic equities, which experienced 
strong returns over the decade. In contrast, non-superannuation financial assets 
declined as a ratio to income so that by the end of the decade superannuation 
assets were larger than all other financial assets. The value of households’ total 
financial assets peaked in late 2007 at over 300 per cent of income, but the 
subsequent falls in values during the financial crisis were larger than for housing 
and valuations and have yet to recover this previous peak.19
Figure 9: Household Balance Sheet


























































































Notes:    Household sector includes unincorporated enterprises; disposable income is before the deduction of 
interest payments
    (a) Includes cash & deposits, equities & unit trusts, and other financial assets
Sources:  ABS; RBA
As discussed above, several factors contributed to the strong growth in house 
prices up to the mid 2000s, with a key one being the liberalisation of the credit 
market. Greater access to credit enabled households to substantially increase 
their borrowing over the 1990s and 2000s. The growth in household borrowing 
outpaced house price growth so that housing gearing increased from 11 per cent 
in 1990, to 21 per cent in 2000, to a little under 30 per cent in 2010. Once house 
prices and borrowing were rising together, it was difficult to determine whether 
increased borrowing capacity led to higher house prices or rising house prices 
spurred increased borrowing.
One benchmark is to compare Australian households’ debt levels to that of other 
countries. In 1990 Australia had one of the lowest household debt-to-income ratios 
in the developed world at 46 per cent. By 2000 it had doubled to 94 per cent and 20
was similar to that in Canada and the United States. By the end of the 2000s, the 
Australian ratio at around 150 per cent of household disposable income was one 
of the highest in a group of comparable developed economies (Battellino 2010).
Even with these higher levels of debt, loan arrears rates and defaults have 
remained low relative to history and other countries (RBA 2011). Further, most 
of the debt is held by higher income households who appear well placed to repay 
this debt (Battellino 2010). Nevertheless, as recent international experiences 
demonstrate, household debt can amplify shocks. As Stevens (2010b) notes, 
Australian households would be prudent not to increase their indebtedness at the 
same rate as over the past two decades.
5.  Monetary and Financial Policy
5.1  The Framework
The past decade saw less debate than in previous decades about the appropriate 
monetary policy framework for Australia. Throughout the 2000s, there was broad 
community and political support for the key elements of the framework which 
include: (i) a medium-term inflation target; (ii) the cash rate being the instrument 
of monetary policy; (iii) the Board of the RBA setting the cash rate independently 
of government; and (iv) the RBA being accountable for, and communicating, 
its decisions.
The main framework-related issue over the decade was the role of monetary 
policy in addressing financial imbalances. While this has recently been topical 
at the global level following the financial crisis, it was extensively discussed in 
Australia in the early years of the decade. Here, the particular issue was the extent 
to which the RBA should take account of the then rapid increases in housing 
credit and housing prices when setting the cash rate.
In 2001, even as the RBA was cutting interest rates as a result of the global 
slowdown in the aftermath of the tech boom, it was expressing concerns that 
lower interest rates risked further boosting housing prices and credit. Then in 
2002 and 2003 as interest rates were being increased, the RBA frequently noted 
the risk of imbalances building up in the housing market. In 2003, in particular, 
the most common theme in speeches and in the RBA’s research agenda was the 
risks posed by unsustainable growth in both housing credit and prices. In part, 21
the RBA’s strategy during this period was to bring to the public’s attention the 
risks involved with making investment decisions on the assumption that the then 
current trends would continue.7 Unlike every other developed country, and most 
large emerging economies, the RBA did not cut interest rates at any point in 2003.
During 2002 and 2003, the RBA came in for some criticism from those who saw 
it as exceeding its mandate or who interpreted its actions as targeting housing 
prices. The RBA went to considerable lengths to explain its actions as consistent 
with flexible inflation targeting and to explain that it was not targeting credit 
growth or asset prices. Developments in the housing market were, however, given 
as one reason for increasing interest rates in response to general macroeconomic 
conditions sooner rather than later.
Internationally, the debate on how monetary policy should respond to emerging 
financial imbalances is far from settled. The weight of opinion has, however, 
shifted somewhat towards the view that in some situations it may be appropriate 
to respond to a big run-up in assets prices that is accompanied by rapid credit 
expansion.8 While this view can sit uncomfortably with a more rigid inflation-
targeting framework where the policy rate is set so that the inflation forecast 
at a fixed horizon is equal to the target midpoint, it is not inconsistent with the 
medium-term inflation-targeting framework that the RBA has employed since 
1993. In particular, in some situations, responding to financial imbalances may 
deliver an average inflation rate that is closer to the target and less volatile, even 
if it results in some short-run deviation from the target. This is particularly so 
if such a response can help avoid a costly ‘boom and bust’ that damages the 
financial system. The challenge here is how this can be done in practice. How 
might adjustments in interest rates be calibrated? What is the trade-off with other 
policy instruments? And, how are such actions best explained to the public? These 
questions are likely to be debated frequently over the decade ahead.
Looking back, it is difficult to judge how effective the RBA’s approach was in the 
early 2000s. The Bank’s comments at that time did, however, attract widespread 
media coverage, including in the popular press. Following the increase in interest 
rates at the end of 2003, housing price growth did decelerate sharply, and Australia 
was able to avoid the worst of the excesses seen in other housing markets around 
7  See Bloxham et al (2010) for a fuller discussion of the RBA’s approach during this period 
as well as actions taken by APRA and ASIC.
8  See Cagliarini, Kent and Stevens (2010) and Miskhin (2011) for more details.22
the world. Furthermore, the adjustment in housing prices was not accompanied 
by major stress in either the household or financial sectors.
Whatever conclusions one draws from that particular episode, the past decade has 
seen a shift globally towards a more flexible approach to inflation targeting. With 
the adoption of inflation targeting by some countries in the 1990s, there was a 
discussion about the importance of constraining the discretion of the central bank, 
so that it delivered on its inflation objective.9 In a sense, this was understandable 
given the experience of earlier decades. But as inflation expectations became 
better anchored, a number of central banks have adopted a more flexible approach 
with greater consideration given to medium-term outcomes, including for output 
and employment. Recently it has also become clearer that low inflation does not 
guarantee financial stability and so there is increasing thought being given to how 
the setting of monetary policy should take into account financial stability issues.
A second framework-related issue that was at times controversial was the 
degree of transparency of the RBA’s decisions. While in 1990 the RBA was 
one of the first central banks to commence releasing a statement announcing 
changes to the policy interest rate, for many years, the RBA was ambivalent 
about the practice of releasing statements and minutes after every Board 
meeting. The main concern was that too frequent communications would 
create additional uncertainty. But by 2007, the evaluation of the benefits and 
costs of increased communication had changed, partly based on the experience 
of other central banks. Since then, a statement has been released after each 
Board meeting and minutes have been released two weeks after the meeting.10   
In February 2008, the Bank also began publishing numerical forecasts for both 
inflation and output on a quarterly basis, after having published descriptive 
forecasts in the Statement on Monetary Policy for over a decade, and the amount 
of material published by the Bank, and the number of public speeches given by 
senior staff, has increased significantly. Unlike many other central banks, RBA 
officials take questions from the media at these speeches, although the RBA 
does not hold regular press conferences as have become increasingly common 
elsewhere.
9  There was also a discussion on the need for ‘penalties’ on the central bank if the inflation 
target was not met.
10 See Stevens (2007) for a full discussion of the reasons for this change.23
One issue that attracts attention periodically is the structure of the RBA Board, 
which has a majority of part-time external members drawn primarily from the 
business community. This longstanding structure is unusual by international 
standards and has both its critics and defenders. Its critics raise the issues of 
conflicts of interest and the capability of part-time members to question the views 
being put by the RBA executives. In contrast, supporters of the current structure 
point to the importance of bringing timely, real-world experience to the RBA’s 
deliberations and the generally successful outcomes delivered by the current 
arrangements. Over the decade the only change made to the appointment process 
was in 2007, when the Treasurer announced that new Board appointments would 
be made from a register of eminent candidates to be maintained by the Secretary 
to the Treasury and the Governor of the RBA.
The Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, which records the common 
understanding of the Governor and the Government on key aspects of Australia’s 
monetary policy framework, was re-signed four times during the decade.11 On 
each occasion, the broad objectives of monetary policy and the key elements of 
the inflation target were reaffirmed. The largest change to the Statement was in 
2010, when a separate section on financial stability was added, recognising the 
RBA’s longstanding responsibilities in this area. The other main changes were made 
in 2007 and related to the RBA’s independence and its increased transparency.
5.2  The Major Policy Considerations
Apart from developments in the housing market, two major issues confronted 
monetary policy over the decade. The first was the very large shift in the relative 
price of commodities, which led to Australia’s terms of trade rising to their highest 
level in over 140 years. The second was the North Atlantic financial crisis and 
the associated severe global recession.
Looking back over the past decade, the most frequently recurring theme in the 
RBA’s communications was the rise in Australia’s terms of trade. This rise has 
not only been very large, but it has taken place almost continuously since 2003, 
although there was a sharp, but temporary dip, during the financial crisis. It was 
largely unexpected and, in hindsight, is explained by the boom in China following 
11 These re-signings occurred in 2003 following the reappointment of Ian Macfarlane as 
Governor, in 2007 when Glenn Stevens was appointed Governor, and in 2007 and 2010 
following federal elections.24
a period of relatively low global investment in resource extraction and food 
production. Like many others, the RBA repeatedly revised up its forecasts for 
the level of commodity prices and the terms of trade over the period (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Terms of Trade
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This rise in the terms of trade, and the frequent upside surprises, meant that for 
most of the decade monetary policy was being tightened. Indeed, from 2004 to 
2008, the RBA’s two-year-ahead forecast for inflation, based on the assumption 
of a constant cash rate, was in the top half of the medium-term target band. Not 
surprisingly, there was a long upswing in the cash rate running from 2002 to 
2008, with monetary policy becoming restrictive in 2006 (Figure 11). The pace 
of tightening picked up in late 2007 as it became clear that capacity pressures 
in the economy were leading to a sharp pick-up in inflation. This pick-up was 
substantially larger than the RBA had been expecting and it saw underlying 
inflation increase to a little above 4½ per cent.12
12 See Lowe (2011) for a detailed account of this pick-up in inflation.25
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This peak in inflation occurred in the September quarter of 2008, just when the 
financial crisis was intensifying dramatically following the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. Despite the high inflation rate, the RBA cut the cash rate rapidly over 
the final months of 2008 as the global economic outlook deteriorated markedly. 
Including the 25 basis point cut in September, the cumulative reduction from 
the peak in the cash rate was 425 basis points to 3 per cent in April 2009, a new 
cyclical low but substantially above policy rates in almost all other developed 
economies.
Importantly, the RBA also provided significant liquidity support to the domestic 
money market. Unlike many other central banks it was able to do this through its 
pre-existing framework for market operations. This framework allowed significant 
flexibility as the RBA had long dealt with a wide range of counterparties, dealt 
in the market every day, and conducted repurchase agreements for a range of 
maturities and with different classes of collateral. Following the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, the RBA, among other actions, increased the supply of settlement 
balances to increase the liquidity of the system and widened the pool of securities 
eligible for repurchase agreements.13 These actions helped smooth the operation 
of the financial system in what were very troubled times globally. Overall, the 
13 See RBA (2009) and Debelle (2010) for more details.26
assistance that was provided was considerably less than in many other countries 
and was able to be unwound relatively quickly as conditions improved.
6.  Fiscal Policy
One of the most striking differences between macroeconomic policy in Australia 
and that in most other developed economies is the way in which fiscal policy has 
been conducted over the past couple of decades.14 In the 11 years to 2007/08, the 
Australian Government ran budget surpluses on 10 occasions, and by 2005/06, 
the Government had no net debt (Figure 12).15 In contrast, most countries in the 
OECD have consistently run budget deficits, with the aggregate debt-to-GDP ratio 
showing little change over the two decades to 2007, before increasing sharply 
during the financial crisis (Figure 13).
Figure 12: General Government Underlying Cash Balance
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It is difficult to pinpoint the reasons why fiscal policy in Australia has been 
conducted so differently to that in many other countries. The strong terms of trade 
has certainly helped, although the commitment to sound fiscal policy predates, 
by quite a few years, the big run-up in the terms of trade. Perhaps its origins lie 
14 For a review see Gruen and Sayegh (2005).
15 The decline in government debt in part also reflected asset sales.27
in the debates in the 1980s and early 1990s about the current account deficit. 
These debates were associated with a sense of national economic insecurity 
regarding the consequences of high and persistent trade deficits. In the national 
soul searching that went on at the time, an increase in public sector savings was 
widely regarded as the most effective way of ‘improving’ the current account 
deficit. This view coincided with some dissatisfaction with the effects of the 
stimulatory fiscal policy in the early 1990s.
Figure 13: General Government Net Financial Liabilities
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In retrospect, it is somewhat ironic that when public savings did increase in the 
mid 1990s there was not a reduction in the average current account deficit. Yet 
the public commitment to sound fiscal policy that emerged during those years has 
been highly persistent. Both major political parties have committed to maintain 
a balanced budget over a run of years, and there is broad public support for this 
approach.
Against this backdrop, three fiscal issues have attracted considerable attention 
at various points over the decade: (i) the role that fiscal policy can play as a 
countercyclical tool; (ii) the appropriate use of the revenue from the resources 
boom; and (iii) the role of public debt in financing public sector infrastructure.28
For some years up until the crisis, the conventional wisdom was that fiscal policy’s 
role as a countercyclical tool was limited to allowing the automatic stabilisers 
to work. Using discretionary fiscal policy was seen as too difficult from both a 
political and implementation perspective. The financial crisis in 2008 changed this, 
with many countries implementing large fiscal stimuli, under the imprimatur of 
the IMF and the G-20. The stimulus in Australia – equivalent to around 6 per cent 
of GDP – was one of the largest in the world. It was also the largest discretionary 
easing of fiscal policy in at least two decades.
One reason that Australia was able to implement such a large stimulus was that 
public finances were in sound shape prior to the crisis; unlike in many other 
countries, the fiscal response was not constrained by concerns about medium-term 
fiscal sustainability. Whether this episode marks a return to more activist fiscal 
policy though remains to be seen. In many respects the circumstances that led to 
the stimulus were highly unusual: a crisis in the global financial system, a very 
large increase in uncertainty and risk aversion, and a collapse in international 
trade. These events were easily identified and were not the result of domestic 
factors, thus overcoming some of the hurdles that can limit the fiscal response 
to a deterioration in economic activity.
A second issue has been how the proceeds of the resources boom should be used. 
In the period from 2004 to 2008, the strong growth in nominal income generated 
strong growth in tax receipts. This growth in revenue was used to fund significant 
cuts in income tax and increase transfer payments to the household sector, as 
well as to build up assets in a number of funds. While estimates of the structural 
budget position during this period are very sensitive to assumptions about the 
ongoing level of the terms of trade, most estimates suggest a deterioration 
during the latter part of this period, although the actual surplus remained around 
1½ per cent of GDP.
During this period there was some debate as to whether the fiscal proceeds from 
the strong economy should have been used in other ways. A similar debate has 
resurfaced over the past year or so when considering how the proceeds of the 
current resources boom should be dealt with if the boom continues. One perspective 
has been that some of the proceeds should be allowed to accumulate in a fund to 
support future spending. The argument here is that, given the uncertainty about 
the longevity of the resources boom, it might be prudent to increase public-sector 
saving to smooth public expenditure and support the economy if the boom were to 29
unexpectedly end.16 A related argument is that saving the proceeds could take some 
of the pressure off aggregate demand. On the other hand, one counterargument is 
the boom is expected to be highly persistent and thus accumulating revenue in a 
fund would be an inappropriate transfer from current taxpayers to future taxpayers. 
Another argument has been that using growth in revenue to fund tax cuts would 
help improve the incentives for work and promote growth in the economy.
A third issue has been the role of the public sector in infrastructure provision. 
From the mid 1980s until around the mid 2000s there was a steady decline in 
public investment relative to GDP, largely due to declining investment by state 
governments. A number of these governments have limited the borrowing that 
they have been prepared to undertake for public infrastructure, partly due to 
concerns that increased borrowing could jeopardise their high credit ratings. 
While this approach has ensured that state government finances have remained 
generally sound, its critics argue that it has led to projects not being undertaken 
that have social rates of return considerably higher than the cost of borrowing.17 
The aversion to debt also saw strong growth in public-private partnerships as 
a way of funding infrastructure, with mixed results. An issue over the coming 
decade is likely to be how to fund public-sector infrastructure and the appropriate 
size of public-sector balance sheets.
7.  Making the Best of the Terms of Trade Boom and Managing 
the Risks
As discussed above, the Australian economy has performed strongly over the past 
two decades and has avoided a severe downturn. From some perspectives though, 
the economy looks to have moved out along the risk-return frontier, particularly 
over the latter part of this period. Australia’s abundant supply of natural resources 
and its strong links with Asia have significantly boosted real incomes and have 
substantially improved the expected outcomes over the next decade. But along 
with the new opportunities and higher expected returns have come new risks.
During the 2000s, Australia’s international trade became more concentrated, both 
in terms of the goods exported and export destinations, potentially exposing the 
Australian economy to larger shocks. Over the past year, for example, exports 
of metal ores and coal have accounted for around 40 per cent of Australia’s 
16 See, for example, Garnaut (2005) and OECD (2010).
17 See, for example, Quiggin (2002), Argy (2007) and Gruen (2010).30
total export receipts, and exports to Asia now constitute more than 60 per cent 
of Australia’s total exports, with Japan and China accounting for two-thirds of 
that. Further, an increasing share of exports is to emerging economies, which 
historically have had more volatile economic growth.
Looking forward, the challenge is to ensure that Australia makes the best of the 
new global economic landscape while at the same time managing the risks that 
come with this landscape.
In taking advantage of the new opportunities, the economy is inevitably undergoing 
significant structural change. The return on capital is high in the resources and 
related sectors, and labour and capital are flowing to these sectors. At the same 
time, other sectors are contracting in relative importance. These adjustments can 
be very difficult for those involved, including the owners of the existing capital 
in the industries not growing strongly and those working in these industries. 
But the economy made similar adjustments in previous decades, and if these 
adjustments do not occur then Australia is likely to forego some of the expected 
benefits that the strong growth in Asia offers.
In addition, for these benefits to be fully realised, productivity growth will need 
to pick up. In the 1990s, strong growth in living standards was underpinned by 
strong growth in output per hour worked. However, productivity growth slowed 
significantly in the 2000s, with output growth being boosted by faster growth in 
capital and labour, and income growth being boosted by the rise in the terms of 
trade (Figure 14).
In the decade ahead, it is highly unlikely that the rise in the terms of trade witnessed 
in the 2000s will be repeated. This means that if living standards are to continue 
to rise at the rate we have become accustomed to, productivity growth will need 
to pick up significantly. For Australia to fully capitalise on the new possibilities, 
both businesses and government need to be focused on improving how things 
are done and addressing inefficiencies in regulation and business practices. If 
this does not occur and complacency bred by good economic times was to set 
in, then some of the benefits that now seem possible would fail to materialise.31
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A related set of challenges is how to ensure that the Australian workforce has the 
appropriate set of skills to take advantage of the new opportunities. There also 
needs to be sufficient and appropriate infrastructure, with a suitable balance found 
between financing public-sector infrastructure and retaining sound public-sector 
balance sheets. In the period ahead, the economy will also need to continue its 
adjustment to more traditional savings patterns by the household sector after 
a protracted period in which growth in consumption exceeded that in income. 
In addition, as an economy with a comparative advantage in the production 
of carbon-based energy, Australia faces a challenge as the world looks to less 
carbon-intensive forms of energy.
In terms of the risks, there is little that Australia can do to reduce the probability 
of economic volatility elsewhere in the world. But the choices that are made 
domestically can have a significant effect on how such volatility affects the 
Australian economy.32
The floating exchange rate remains a key stabilising influence. Over the past 
three decades, movements in the value of the Australian dollar have played an 
important role in offsetting some of the effects of large shocks from the global 
economy (Debelle and Plumb 2006). While these movements can have significant 
implications for individual businesses, for the overall economy they have been 
a source of stability.
Retaining flexibility in other areas is also a significant form of risk mitigation. 
One area that is important is the labour market. During the 2008–2009 downturn, 
flexibility in working arrangements and hours meant that the downturn in labour 
demand was spread more evenly across the workforce than would have occurred 
with less flexible arrangements. This spread the burden of adjustment and, 
arguably, helped avoid a more serious downturn in the economy.
The ability to respond quickly and decisively with macroeconomic policy is also 
important from a risk management perspective. Ensuring that the monetary policy 
framework remains credible is obviously important here. And in terms of fiscal 
policy, there is a need to ensure that public debt levels remain relatively low and 
that the medium-term fiscal outlook is seen as credible, and that fiscal policy is 
sufficiently flexible to be able to respond and be adjusted quickly.
More broadly, one form of possible risk mitigation is for the nation to save a 
significant share of the benefits of the resources boom, and then to only gradually 
increase spending if the outcomes are as positive as expected. Whether this is 
desirable though depends, in part, on society’s tolerance of bearing risk. The 
benefit of higher savings is that if things do not work out as expected, costly 
adjustments might be avoided, or at least mitigated. Of course, the downside is 
that if things do work out well, current levels of national consumption are lower 
than desirable, with future consumption increasing strongly not only because of 
the favourable economic outcomes, but also because of the saving that is done 
now.
Another way in which risk is moderated is through foreign ownership in the 
mining sector. With a larger mining sector, growth in output and employment, 
and tax revenue, are more correlated with resource prices and demand than they 
have been in the past. Foreign ownership of the mining sector, however, means 
domestic investors hold more non-mining assets, including foreign assets, and 
so their investment income is less correlated with resources and the associated 33
spillovers to the economy. Indeed, foreign ownership of this sector is estimated 
to be much higher than for the corporate sector as a whole. While this reduces 
the already substantial benefits to domestic residents of a mining boom, it also 
reduces the domestic costs of a mining downturn.
Overall, the 2000s were another prosperous decade for Australia. Strong 
employment growth contributed to a sustained fall in the unemployment rate and, 
along with a substantial increase in the capital stock, to faster growth in output 
than in most other developed economies. Over the latter part of the decade, the 
unprecedented increase in the terms of trade significantly boosted domestic income 
growth. To a considerable extent, the ability of the economy to prosper in this 
environment and avoid the overheating seen in previous booms in the terms of 
trade reflects the benefits of the flexible economic framework put in place over the 
past few decades and sound macroeconomic management over this period. The 
slowdown in productivity growth, after the pick-up in the 1990s, however, raises 
some troubling questions. While it is far from certain why productivity growth 
declined, what is clear is that for standards of living to continue to increase as 
they have in recent decades, faster productivity growth will be needed. Overall 
though, there remains much to be optimistic about. The Australian economy 
has demonstrated resilience and adaptability over the 2000s, and no doubt these 
characteristics will need to be on display once again over the coming decade.34
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APM
The following Copyright and Disclaimer Notices apply to data on dwelling prices 
obtained from Australian Property Monitors (APM) and reported in this RDP.
In compiling this information APM relies upon information supplied by a number 
of external sources. The information is supplied on the basis that while APM 
believes that all the information in it will be correct at the time of publication, it 
does not warrant its accuracy or completeness.
Copyright in State Government Sourced Data
Queensland: Based on or contains data provided by the State of Queensland 
(Department of Environment and Resource Management) 2010. In consideration 
of the state permitting use of this data you acknowledge and agree that the State 
gives no warranty in relation to the data (including the accuracy, reliability, 
completeness, currency, or suitability) and accepts no liability (including without 
limitation, liability in negligence) for any loss, damage or costs (including 
consequential damage) relating to any use of the data. Data must not be used for 
direct marketing or used in breach of the privacy laws.
South Australia: Notice: The above information is based in part on data provided 
by the South Australian Government. Copyright in this information belongs to 
the South Australian Government and the South Australian Government does not 
accept any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the information or 
its suitability for any purpose. Use of the data for any form of direct marketing 
is strictly prohibited.
Northern Territory: Copyright in the underlying data for the Northern Territory is 
owned by the Northern Territory of Australia, represented by the Department of 
Infrastructure, Planning and Environment for which no responsibility is accepted.
Tasmania: This product incorporates data that is copyright owned by the Crown 
in Right of Tasmania. The data has been used in the product with the permission 
of the Crown in Right of Tasmania.39
The Crown in Right of Tasmania and its employees and agents:
a.  give no warranty regarding the data’s accuracy, completeness, currency, or 
suitability for any particular purpose
b.  do not accept liability howsoever arising including but not limited to 
negligence for any loss resulting from the use of or reliance upon the data.
Victoria: Some underlying Victorian information is © State of Victoria. Accuracy 
not warranted. Use is on the basis that the State of Victoria shall bear no 
responsibility or liability whatsoever for any errors, faults, defects or omissions 
in that information.
Western Australia: Based on information provided by and with the permission of 
the Western Australian Land Information Authority (2010) trading as Landgate.
Australian Capital Territory:  Notice:  Some  information  in  the  Home  Price 
Guide is licensed from ACT Planning and Land Management. Please note: 
‘The Territory Data is the property of the Australian Capital Territory. No part 
of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, 
photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should be directed to: 
Manager, Customer Services, ACT Planning and Land Authority GPO Box 1908 
CANBERRA ACT 2601’.
The Territory Data in The Home Price Guide is supplied on the basis that:
a.  users shall not use the Territory Data for producing any promotional material 
which identify any particular property owner or person
b.  users shall not sell, transfer or sub-licence the Territory Data.
New South Wales: Contains property sales information provided under licence 
from the Department of Lands NSW.